Military Drill and Port Restrictions: India’s Double Action Against Bangladesh

May 20, 2025 • Opinion
Military Drill and Port Restrictions: India’s Double Action Against Bangladesh
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Opinion

After conducting the “Teesta Prahar” military exercise near the Siliguri or “Chicken’s Neck” corridor along the Bangladesh border, India imposed new restrictions on Bangladesh’s garment exports on Saturday night. Following its conflict with Pakistan, India has now turned its attention to its eastern neighbor Bangladesh, a country transitioning from being a “close friend” to an “uncertain position.”

Last week, India took two significant steps that served as clear warnings to the Yunus government in Dhaka. First, the “Teesta Prahar” military exercise involved India’s Trishakti Corps showcasing its air power, electronic warfare, infantry, armored forces, artillery, and special forces in a battlefield-like scenario.

This exercise, conducted shortly after the conflict with Pakistan, is perceived as a provocative message aimed at the Yunus government. Yunus and his advisors have previously commented on India’s “vulnerable” Siliguri corridor and the potential capture of India’s northeastern region if a war with China arises.

A few days after the exercise, New Delhi imposed restrictions on garment imports from Bangladesh, mandating that these goods can now only enter India through Kolkata and Mumbai (Nava Sheva) seaports.

This measure is seen as a strategic response to recent developments in Dhaka, aiming to maintain bilateral economic relations while strengthening control over specific trade channels. The restrictions apply not only to garments but also to other Bangladeshi imports.

In essence, India has closed all routes for vehicles entering from Bangladesh, leaving only two pathways open. This is more a matter of border security than commercial restrictions. Perhaps India no longer trusts Bangladesh and is building an invisible but impenetrable barrier at the border for its security. Visa restrictions had already been tightened long ago.

A report by the Global Trade Research Initiative (GTRI) warned that limiting imports through land ports could harm export trade worth approximately USD 770 million, accounting for about 42% of total imports. The biggest impact will be on Bangladesh’s ready-made garment export sector, valued at USD 618 million annually. These goods can now only enter India through two designated seaports, as critical land routes have been closed.

This decision stems from two notable diplomatic missteps by the Yunus government. In August last year, Yunus came to power after Sheikh Hasina’s government was ousted through a “color revolution.” Following the Pahalgam massacre, Yunus’s close associate, retired Major General A.L.M. Fazlur Rahman, a former chief of Bangladesh’s Border Guard, remarked on social media, “If India attacks Pakistan, Bangladesh should capture India’s northeastern seven states.”

Moreover, Yunus himself made a controversial speech in China, declaring Bangladesh the “sole guardian” of the Indian Ocean and stating that India’s northeastern states depend on Bangladesh for access to the Bay of Bengal.

The roots of this distrust in years of friendship run deep.

Since the great victory in the 1971 Liberation War, Pakistan’s allies have ingrained an anti-India sentiment in ordinary Bangladeshis. A certain group, angered by India’s role in Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan, propagated rumors.

Such propaganda included claims like, “If the Awami League comes to power, mosques will echo with ululations, the country will be sold to India, people won’t be able to practice their faith, cows won’t be sacrificed, and daughters won’t be safe.” These rumors spread like a virus, deeply embedding themselves in certain groups’ minds.

The far-reaching results of this propaganda were evident in last July-August’s stakeholder generation, raised with these biases. They now represent the current interim government. The chants of “Delhi or Dhaka, Dhaka Dhaka” by the leaders of the July movement indicate how anti-India sentiment has finally taken root in the government.

India has moved into a precautionary stance for this very reason. Sharing a border of over 4,000 kilometers with Bangladesh, India now has valid reasons to distrust the current government. It would not be surprising if, in the future, India halts electricity supplies or restricts airspace access for Bangladesh.

Who would want to benefit a hostile neighbor that issues threats of unequal warfare and insults them in the media? Would anyone in India’s powerful position, with a strong military and economy, want to continue supplying rice or onions to such a neighbor or engage in trade under favorable terms?

It’s like sharing Wi-Fi passwords or allowing access through one’s backyard to a neighbor who constantly disrupts peace, spreads misinformation, and complains about one’s internal matters. What powerful neighbor would tolerate this? They, too, have limits to their patience.

A similar scenario is developing with Myanmar, a neighbor sharing a 271 km border. Bangladesh appears to be aiding rebel groups opposing Myanmar’s junta government, which has already angered the Myanmar government. Complaints have been lodged in Moscow with Russian President Putin and visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping.

To please anti-India groups and their anti-India rhetoric, the interim government, led by its student-coordinated appointees, has adopted a similar approach. Meanwhile, it has sought to monopolize trade in the Seven Sisters to bring economic “prosperity” to Bangladesh—a contradictory stance.

India has responded appropriately with dual signals. The 3.5 trillion GDP India has shown the 437 billion GDP Bangladesh its “status.” Now it remains to be seen how Dr. Yunus, by provoking a powerful and prosperous neighbor like India, manages to become Southeast Asia’s “guardian.”

It’s unprecedented in history for Bangladesh to have had such hostile neighbors. Overconfidence in one seaport and the incitement of foreign patrons have led to deteriorated relations with two neighboring countries sharing borders. Yet, since independence, Bangladesh’s foreign policy has been “friendship with all, enmity with none.” After 54 years, that policy now shows deep cracks.

-Jajabor Pothik
Geopolitical Analyst

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