Has the United States Really Learned Nothing from 9/11?

Michael Rubin’s warning about the new geopolitical reality in Bangladesh

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September 11, 2001. The horrific terrorist attacks on US soil not only changed American security policy, but also the language of international politics. Terrorism, extremism, state sponsorship, and the geopolitics of the Middle East—everything Washington began to look at anew.

But after nearly two and a half decades, American author and analyst Michael Rubin has raised the question: Has the United States really learned the necessary lessons from 9/11?

In his recent article published in 19FortyFive, Rubin’s main point is that the United States repeatedly makes a fundamental mistake in its fight against terrorism. Viewing a state solely as a strategic ally does not ignore its internal political ideology, intelligence activities, or potential connections to extremist groups.

In Rubin’s view, one of the lessons of 9/11 was—

The risk of terrorism is not limited to a specific terrorist organization; the ideology, political networks, and state relations behind it must also be taken into account.

He sought to see the recent political changes in Bangladesh within this larger logic.

Why is the Bangladesh context important?

Rubin’s analysis is that Bangladesh’s political transformation is not an isolated domestic event. He sees it as part of the changing geopolitics of South Asia and the wider Muslim world.

According to his argument, the fall of Sheikh Hasina, the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, the political ban on the Awami League, and the subsequent rise to power of the BNP—along with these changes, it is necessary to consider a possible new direction for Bangladesh’s foreign policy.

He particularly emphasizes the new political engagement with Turkey, which he sees under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as not just a normal state but a potential hub for a larger Islamist geopolitical network.

From there, Rubin raised questions about the future political direction of Bangladesh.

However, an important distinction needs to be made here. Diplomatic relations with Turkey or a Bangladeshi leader’s meeting with Erdogan is not in itself evidence of adopting an Islamist political stance. In state diplomacy, closeness to Turkey can be forged for a variety of reasons—trade, investment, defense, regional politics, and relations with the Muslim world.

Therefore, Rubin’s position is essentially a political inference or probability analysis, not a directly proven fact.

The question of Pakistan’s influence

Rubin also highlighted the influence of Pakistani intelligence agencies behind the student movement and political changes in Bangladesh. He claims that Pakistani intelligence activities played a role in the course of the student movement in Bangladesh and ultimately contributed to the downfall of Sheikh Hasina.

This is one of the most important claims in his article, but also one of the most verifiable.

Because the possibility of foreign influence in a country’s political movement and the fact that that foreign power has controlled the movement are not the same.

The first is possible; the second requires strong evidence.

To prove whether a foreign intelligence agency has actually directed or influenced a movement, contact information, evidence of funding, organizational ties, operational direction, and direct influence on the course of events are required.

Rubin’s article does not present detailed evidence for this causal chain, so it is more reasonable to view this claim as a serious allegation or hypothesis for now.

The question of Awami League, BNP and political Islam

Another important aspect of Rubin’s analysis is that he sees Bangladeshi politics as a potential secular–Islamist realignment .

However, the political reality in Bangladesh is more complex.

Limiting Bangladeshi politics to a secular versus Islamist conflict leaves out important issues such as nationalism, anti-India and pro-India sentiment, economic interests, democratic aspirations, the political role of youth, party competition, and long-standing power struggles.

Similarly, it is analytically problematic to equate political Islam and jihadist terrorism.

An Islamist political party may participate in electoral politics. On the other hand, a jihadist organization may reject the state structure and achieve political goals through violence. These two tendencies are not the same.

Therefore, the increasing influence of Islamist political forces in Bangladesh does not automatically mean an increase in the risk of terrorism.

But this is where Rubin’s question becomes important: At what point does the connection between political Islam and violent extremist networks become a risk to national security?

There is no way to ignore this question.

“Axis of Ikhwan”—Rubin’s larger geopolitical concept

To understand Rubin’s concerns about Bangladesh, it is important to understand his larger geopolitical concept.

He sees the growing ties between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan as a potential Islamist geopolitical axis and fears that several countries, including Bangladesh, could join this ring in the future.

The essence of this idea is that today’s security threats do not lie solely in the hands of a single terrorist organization. Rather, they can be a larger network of states, political parties, religious ideologies, intelligence networks, economic ties, and diplomatic contacts.

From this perspective, the change in Bangladesh can be given importance.

Bangladesh is geographically located at the crossroads of South Asia, the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Northeast, and Southeast Asia. As a result, changes in Bangladesh’s foreign policy are not just an internal matter for Dhaka; they are also linked to the interests of India, Pakistan, China, Türkiye, the Gulf countries, and the United States.

But where is the weakness in Rubin’s argument?

While Rubin’s warning can be taken seriously, his analysis raises several major questions.

First, he arranges various events into a specific narrative. This carries the risk of confirmation bias . That is, events that are consistent with a preconceived idea may be given more importance.

Second, he sometimes uses political contact as evidence of ideological alignment, although in international politics, contact between one country and another does not always mean ideological closeness.

Third, a simple causal chain between political Islam and terrorism cannot be assumed.

Fourth, the analysis remains incomplete without giving sufficient importance to the domestic factors behind Bangladesh’s internal political changes.

Why is the warning still important?

Perhaps the most important aspect of Rubin’s argument is not his labeling of Bangladesh as a “terrorist state.” Rather, he is putting forward an early-warning framework .

His question is – when a state changes politically, can its foreign policy, security cooperation, and international networks also change?

The answer is – of course it can.

Therefore, in the case of Bangladesh, it is necessary to keep an eye on a few things:

• Real changes in the new government’s foreign policy;
• Security and intelligence cooperation with Pakistan and Turkey;
• Political relations with Middle Eastern states;
• Activities of extremist organizations in the country;
• The state’s position in suppressing militancy;
• The relationship between religious and political organizations;
• Counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and Western countries;
• The future of security cooperation between India and Bangladesh.

Only by observing these indicators together can we understand whether Bangladesh is truly moving towards a new geopolitical arena.

What is the real lesson of 9/11?

The biggest lesson from Rubin’s article is also relevant for Bangladesh.

It is not enough to judge a country solely by the declared policies of its government.

Political changes within the state, the ideological positions of political parties, international partnerships, intelligence cooperation, and relations with non-state organizations—everything must be viewed together.

But another lesson is also important: fear cannot be accepted as evidence.

If Bangladesh develops close ties with an Islamist or new regional alliance in the future, it would be wrong to automatically call it a move towards terrorism, just as it would be wrong to completely deny the potential security risks.

Evidence-based assessment will be required.

Last words

The most powerful point of Michael Rubin’s article is that the United States should not be stuck just on the question of “who are our allies”; it should also look at “who our ally states are in relations with, what political forces they support, and what ideologies influence their politics.”

In the case of Bangladesh, the question is not so simple: “Is Bangladesh becoming Islamist?”

Rather the question should be:

Are Bangladesh’s political changes changing its geopolitical position?

Is this change taking Bangladesh’s relations with Türkiye, Pakistan, the Gulf states, and other powers into a new framework?

And what impact might that change have on security cooperation between the United States, India, and Bangladesh?

These questions cannot be answered definitively at this time. But Rubin’s warning brings to the fore at least one point – political change must be viewed not only as a shift in internal power, but also as its long-term geopolitical and security consequences.

If there is one lesson to be learned from 9/11, it is that:

Major security crises do not usually arise suddenly; they are preceded by a long series of smaller political, ideological, and geopolitical shifts.

The biggest responsibility of policymakers is to identify those changes in a timely manner.