Analysis | Can Bangladesh Afford to Dismiss Warnings of Extremism Without Verification?

-Dr. Lubna Ferdousi, educationist and researcher

 

When the minister in charge of internal security rejects a terrorism alert report before reading it, the concern is not just the alert itself but the state’s ability to respond to it.

Terrorism does not begin on the day of a bomb explosion.
The explosion is usually the last scene.

 

Long before that moment comes radicalization, recruitment, ideological brainwashing, financing, encrypted communications, logistical preparations, propaganda, and the formation of small networks—sometimes operating under the state’s radar for months or even years.

Bangladesh has already learned this lesson at great cost. Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh did not suddenly emerge on August 17, 2005, when hundreds of bombs exploded almost simultaneously in 63 districts. The militants who attacked the Holy Artisan Bakery on July 1, 2016, did not become extremists that morning. And the killings of bloggers, publishers, and secular activists between 2013 and 2016 have shown how ideological dehumanization can gradually transform from rhetoric to targeted violence.

This history is important, because Bangladesh is once again facing an early warning—this time about Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, or AQIS.

What does the UN report actually say?

The 38th report of the UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, which monitors threats related to ISIL and Al-Qaeda, expressed concern about AQIS attempting to establish cells in Bangladesh. The wording is important.

The report does not declare that Bangladesh has become a base for al-Qaeda. Nor does it establish that a fully operational AQIS infrastructure already exists in the country. This is a threat assessment, not a criminal conviction.

But the report places the Bangladesh-related concerns within a broader regional assessment. It describes AQIS as evolving from a fragmented organization into a regional terrorist entity, building logistical and financial networks and relying increasingly on decentralized, small, and scattered cells. That is precisely why the warning warrants investigation.

Modern terrorist organizations do not necessarily require large training camps, hundreds of visible fighters, or a headquarters to their name. A few extremist individuals, an organizer, secure digital communications, a little funding, and access to logistical resources can be enough to create a dangerously effective cell. So Bangladesh does not need to look for the AQIS of 2026 in the organizational mold of the JMB of 2005.

The minister who didn’t read the report

Against this backdrop, the response of Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed is remarkable. He described the UN warning as largely “speculative” and indicated that the government was not taking it into account. Yet in the same conversation, he admitted that he had not read the report and had only heard about it.

This sequence is difficult to maintain: decision before reading, evaluation before verification, rejection before testing. If this becomes the new method of intelligence analysis, Bangladesh may have inadvertently invented a new field: counterterrorism operations based on rumors.

There is no point in challenging any UN assessment. Governments should challenge intelligence. The UN is not infallible, member state reports can be incomplete, and uncertainty is inevitable in threat assessments. But there is a huge difference between: “We have examined the evidence and cannot support this assessment,” and “I have not read the report, but I understand it is speculative, so we are not taking it seriously.”

The first is evidence-based skepticism. The second is premature denial. And in counterterrorism operations, this difference can be fatal.

Intelligence should be done before an explosion. Counterterrorism threat assessments and criminal evidence serve different purposes. The court wants to know whether a crime has occurred, who committed it, and whether the evidence proves guilt according to applicable legal standards. Intelligence analysis wants to know something else: What indicators indicate that a threat is developing before a crime occurs?

If the government waits for 100% proof before investigating a terrorist threat, then there is little point in intelligence gathering. Forensic investigators can only come in after the explosion. The whole point of preventive intelligence is to identify patterns in the incomplete: recruitment activities, unusual financing, connections between actors, border crossings, propaganda networks, weapons acquisitions or encrypted operational communications. It does not justify arresting someone on mere suspicion. It justifies the investigation.

Bangladesh’s history makes careless denial particularly uncomfortable. Reports of extremist networks were sometimes openly played down during the rise of Bangla Bhai and militant organizations in the early 2000s. Then came the coordinated bombings of August 2005. The lesson should have been: a terrorist network does not cease to exist simply because the state refuses to recognize it.

The Holy Artisan reinforced the same lesson. The attack was visible on a terrible evening. The radicalization and networks behind it had already been established.

Questions to ask in Dhaka

Instead of debating whether the UN can be automatically trusted, Bangladesh should ask—what intelligence information generated this warning? What is the Bangladesh-specific evidence base for the assessment? How many member states have provided relevant information? Has Dhaka sought further intelligence through appropriate channels? Have the CTTC, the anti-terrorism unit, and national intelligence agencies independently supported any operational, financial, or communications links? Is there any evidence of recruitment efforts? Are there financial or propaganda networks operating in Bangladesh? Are there any links to other regional networks in South Asia?

These questions do not assume that the UN is right. They are about how a competent state determines whether it is right or not.

Therefore, the appropriate government response could have been very simple: the government has received the assessment; the relevant agencies are examining its evidence base; Bangladesh will seek additional information if necessary; and credible threats will be investigated and countered in accordance with the law. No panic. No surrender of national judgment to the UN. But no denial before verification either.

Bangladesh is located in a dangerous neighboring region.

The warning must also be understood geographically. To the northwest of Bangladesh is the Afghanistan-Pakistan security environment, shaped by the return of the Taliban to power and the continued activities of the TTP, the Islamic State Khorasan Province, al-Qaeda-linked networks, and other armed actors. To the east is Myanmar, where central state authority has been dramatically weakened and armed groups are increasingly exercising regional power.

These two theaters include India, Bangladesh, and the Bay of Bengal. This geography means that Bangladesh cannot afford to view cross-border militancy as someone else’s internal problem.

Political tensions between Dhaka, Delhi, or Islamabad should also not be allowed to paralyze counterterrorism intelligence cooperation. Terrorist networks do not suspend deployments because neighboring governments are bickering. Regional intelligence cooperation should therefore be seen as a security necessity, not a diplomatic favor.

The digital battlefield has changed.

The contemporary radicalization environment also looks different than it did two decades ago. The same UN report discusses the growing role of online recruitment and the shift from open social media environments to encrypted communication platforms. This does not mean that using encrypted messaging is questionable. Millions of ordinary citizens use such applications legitimately.

The intelligence question is not technical, but behavioral: who is recruiting whom, what kind of material is being disseminated, are ideological relationships transforming into operational relationships, how money is moving, and are online networks creating offline capabilities. This is where Bangladesh needs a strong digital intelligence capability—not indiscriminate surveillance, but targeted, lawful, and technically sophisticated network analysis.

The Holy Artisan attack should have seemed to have permanently destroyed another comfortable stereotype: that terrorism is only for the poor, the uneducated, or the socially marginalized. It is not. Educated, urban, and middle-class people can also become extremists. Extremism has no reliable dress code, social class, or educational background.

Unresolved questions after liberation

Another point deserves scrutiny. The European Union Agency for Asylum’s 2025 Bangladesh Country Assessment noted an increase in the organizational activities of extremist groups after August 2024. More specifically, it cited Bangladeshi prison authorities as saying that 174 prisoners associated with militant organizations were released on bail between August 5 and December 5, 2024. This number needs to be interpreted with caution.

Release on bail does not prove guilt, and the executive cannot override a judicial decision simply because a person has previously been involved in a security investigation. But from a counter-terrorism perspective, the return to society of a significant number of previously identified individuals creates a clear risk-management need.

Where personal evidence justifies it, Bangladesh needs to provide legal post-release risk assessments, rehabilitation, desegregation programs, psychological support, credible religious counseling, employment assistance, and proportionate monitoring of potential reconnection with extremist networks.

The relevant question, therefore, is not whether these individuals should have been deprived of their legal rights. The question is whether the interim government, and subsequently the current government, established adequate mechanisms to assess and manage identifiable risks after their release. This requires a transparent institutional response.

Neither denial nor return to authoritarian counterterrorism policies

On the other hand, there is an equally important warning. Taking terrorism seriously cannot become an excuse for indiscriminate arrests, political repression, extrajudicial violence, or using religious identity as evidence of extremism. Bangladesh’s past counterterrorism experience cannot be separated from the accusation that national security institutions and narratives have sometimes been misused for political ends.

But the logical conclusion of abusive counterterrorism policies is not that terrorism no longer exists. The answer is better counterterrorism policies: lawful, intelligence-led, proportionate, and judicially accountable.

Not branding a political opponent as a terrorist. Not branding an entire religious community as a security suspect. Not mass surveillance without legal safeguards. But equally, not dismantling professional counterterrorism capabilities because previous governments abused parts of the security structure. Not network blindness. And not a romantic belief that extremism will disappear if governments stop talking.

Follow the network and money

Bangladesh now needs an integrated threat-assessment framework, which will link the CTTC, the Anti-Terrorism Unit, relevant intelligence agencies, Border Guard Bangladesh, the Cyber-Intelligence Capability, and the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit.

Terrorist financing requires particular attention. Where intelligence provides a reasonable basis, authorities should examine hundi networks, suspicious cross-border transfers, cryptocurrencies, abuse of charitable structures, and small-scale logistics financing.

Again, accuracy is key. Network-investigating counterterrorism policies can protect democracy. Identity-based profiling counterterrorism policies can undermine it and ultimately contribute to the allegations that extremist recruiters rely on. So the goal should be to disrupt without creating collective suspicion.

The most dangerous time comes before the explosion.

The most worrying aspect of the Home Secretary’s response is ultimately institutional. A minister does not speak simply as a private commentator. His words trickle down through the bureaucracy. When the person in charge of internal security publicly downplays a potential threat before it has been verified, subordinate institutions can reasonably interpret this as a signal of political priority.

This is exactly the signal Bangladesh should avoid. For a mature government, there are only two options: accepting every terrorism warning without question and dismissing it as terrorism. There is a third option: verify it.

Want evidence. Examine intelligence. Map networks. Examine funding. Strengthen regional cooperation. Assess recruitment patterns. Investigate credible indicators. Disrupt operational capabilities where the law allows. Then tell the public what can be responsibly disclosed. This is not panic. This is not authoritarianism. This is statesmanship.

Bangladesh has already paid an extraordinarily high price for the education that terrorist organizations are formed before they become visible. So the most terrifying moment of terrorism is not actually the explosion.

Sometimes it is the silence that precedes it—a time when people are being recruited, ideologies are being normalized, money is being circulated, networks are being connected, and warning signals are being accumulated, while the state reassures itself that nothing has yet been conclusively proven.

No UN warning should ever be accepted as infallible truth. But it should be investigated before it is rejected. Because proving a warning wrong after examining the evidence is a competent government. Declaring it wrong before reading it is something entirely different.