Ali Shariati Ubach
Since the formation of the interim government, militant activities in Bangladesh have increased significantly. Not only have their operations expanded, but militants are also carrying out their activities openly without facing any obstacles—similar to what we witnessed between 2001 and 2005. Back then, they enjoyed state patronage, and now they are receiving it again.
Militancy thrives in a country when economic, political, legal, and social factors favor the militants. Alarmingly, under the current government, the first three of these factors are present, and efforts are underway to establish them socially as well.
The activities of banned terrorist organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Ansar al-Islam (also known as Ansarullah Bangla Team – ABT), Harkatul Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B), Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Jamaatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya, Allah’s Party, Imam Mahmud Kafela Group, Hamza Brigade, and the state’s attitude toward them indicate that the Yunus government seeks political gains by relying on militancy.
Alongside openly radical Islamist parties like Jamaat-e-Islami, Hefazat-e-Islam, and Islami Andolan Bangladesh, which played a role in the July-August anti-government movement, these covertly active groups have also gained significant favor under the interim government.
Institutions Being Destroyed:
The interim government’s lack of commitment to countering terrorism and extremism is evident. The removal of dedicated and skilled counter-terrorism officers from law enforcement agencies—such as the Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU), Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC), DGFI, NSI, RAB, and SB’s counter-militancy cells—has weakened the country’s anti-terrorism efforts. Experienced officers have been systematically dismissed, terminated, or subjected to cases and arrests, undermining counter-terrorism operations.
Moreover, to cast doubt on anti-militancy drives, members of law enforcement agencies are being prosecuted in international crime tribunals, discouraging future operations. The media is also barred from questioning these developments.
Easy Bail for Militants:
Under the Awami League government, terrorism and extremism were fully controlled, with Sheikh Hasina’s zero-tolerance policy achieving remarkable success. However, after August 5, the situation has completely reversed. Recent data shows that around 1,639 hardcore militants have been arrested and granted bail at different times. The actual number is far higher, as many operatives of banned groups remain undetected.
The Inspector General of Prisons stated in a press conference on December 4: “After August 5, 70 militants escaped from jail.” Regarding bail, he said, “174 members of JMB and other militant groups have been released on bail.” Additionally, a source revealed that 916 militants were imprisoned as convicted or under-trial suspects until August 4. Of the 70 escapees mentioned by the IG Prisons, only one has been rearrested—the rest remain at large.
According to combined estimates from various agencies, there are 117 top militants in Bangladesh. Of these, 48 have been released on bail after August 5, along with another 264 militants, totaling 312 confirmed and recognized militants granted bail by the government—an unprecedented move. Even death-row convicts and militants involved in the Holey Artisan attack have been released on bail, with no opposition from the state during bail hearings.
Prominent figures among those released include Mufti Jasim Uddin Rahmani, top leader of Ansar al-Islam, along with his associates Mufti Harun Izhar, Abu Hasan Osama, Mahmud Hasan Gunvi, and Dr. Rafat Chowdhury, leader of Jamaatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya. After their release, they are being treated as celebrities, openly spreading hatred against democracy, secularism, women’s freedom, the Liberation War, cultural activities, shrines, religious minorities, sculptures, the Awami League, and other progressive political parties—all under the guise of Islamic sermons.
Changing the Definition of Militants:
On September 12, 2024, the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit (CTTC) raided a house in Shah Ali, Dhaka, arresting two militants with bomb-making materials—a successful operation based on intelligence from the U.S. Embassy. Initially reported as a militant arrest, the narrative changed within an hour on orders from the top, replacing the word “militant” with “saboteur.” This reflects the government’s soft approach toward militancy, normalizing it as a reward for their role in toppling Sheikh Hasina’s government in the July-August movement.
Four Militants Flee to Europe:
Recent reports confirm that four identified Bangladeshi militants entered France on Schengen visas about a month ago. They obtained visas through the French Embassy, changed their names, acquired new national IDs and passports, and flew to Europe—all facilitated by the government’s tacit approval and relaxed passport verification rules. Security analysts fear these militants, now under the supervision of an anarchist Bengali blogger in France, may target freethinkers and Awami League activists following Ayatollah Khomeini’s model.
Statistics on Bail Recipients:
After August 5, militants have been granted bail en masse, with both higher and lower courts showing unusual leniency—indicating high-level government influence.
– Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB):119 members released, including 5 from *New JMB*. Seven have since disappeared.
– Harkatul Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B): 17 released, 2 disappeared, 10 convicted.
– Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT)/Ansar al-Islam (AAI): 47 released, 11 disappeared, 3 escaped from jail, 10 convicted.
– Jamaatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya: 71 released, including leader *Dr. Rafat Chowdhury* (son of Jamaat-e-Islami’s chief *Shafiqur Rahman*).
– Hizb ut-Tahrir: 11 released, 9 convicted, still holding rallies despite being banned.
– Allah’s Party: 2 released, both disappeared.
– Hamza Brigade: 9 released.
– Imam Mahmud Kafela Group: 13 released.
– KNF (Kuki Chin): 2 released.
– Other suspected militants: 21 released.
Government’s Open Patronage:
On September 20, 2024, a combined list of 279 militants was submitted to high government officials, urging opposition to their bail. However, the government ignored it, granting bail to all on the list and many others. Meanwhile, the Law Advisor publicly instructed judges not to grant bail to Awami League activists.
Adding the 69 militants who escaped on August 5 to the 312 released on bail, the total reaches 381—now considered trusted allies of the Yunus government, despite being a threat to Bangladesh.
Obstacle to a Liberal Society:
Under the interim government, religious extremist groups are enjoying unprecedented freedom, threatening democracy, secularism, and social harmony in the long run. This is eroding Bangladesh’s traditional pluralism, branding it as a regressive, extremist state globally.
Islamist political parties and jihadist networks have grown bolder, openly demanding the replacement of the 1972 Constitution with Sharia-based laws—echoed in mosques, madrasas, and digital platforms with state indifference or silent approval. These groups are no longer marginal voices but increasingly influence government decisions, reshaping public discourse and challenging Bangladesh’s secular, pluralistic identity.
Encouraged by growing impunity, these extremists are pressuring secular social and cultural activities, sports, entertainment, women’s empowerment, educational institutions, and even government offices—systematically infiltrating every sphere of public life to impose their ideological agenda.
What Next?
Bangladesh’s current trajectory bears alarming similarities to Afghanistan’s descent into religious authoritarianism. The erosion of democratic institutions, power consolidation by an unelected regime, and rising Islamist influence threaten the nation’s secular framework, raising serious regional and global security concerns.
Islamist and extremist forces are increasingly embedded within state machinery, infiltrating the military, police, and judiciary. The National Citizens’ Platform (NCP), emerging from July’s movement, acts as their civilian front, providing political legitimacy. Empowered by the interim regime, these groups are advancing an agenda that normalizes fundamentalism, jihadist rhetoric, and Sharia imposition while systematically dismantling secular norms.
Their strategy extends beyond state institutions, penetrating political, social, cultural, and educational spheres to gradually reshape societal ideology. Through this multi-pronged approach, they aim to establish Sharia-based governance, laying the groundwork for transforming Bangladesh into a theocratic authoritarian state—posing an existential threat to its secular and democratic identity.
No Hope in Yunus’s Era:
A reliable government source confirms that Chief Advisor Dr. Yunus instructed intelligence chiefs not to interfere with militants. This directive takes us back to the 2001-2005 era of Bangla Bhai, when the government denied militancy’s existence—until militants detonated 500 bombs simultaneously across 63 districts, exposing the lie. Where will Dr. Yunus’s militant-friendly policies ultimately lead Bangladesh?

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