-Jahanara Noori
One of the main roles of an Islamic sister who joins the Jamaat-e-Islami party in Bangladesh may be to help her fellow male members—called brother believers—relieve “sexual distress.”
Yes, you read that right.
Over the past few decades, stories have come out through the cracks—whispers among friends in educational institutions, bits and pieces of information leaked from behind the niqab and hijab. Little by little, the truth has become clear: Jamaat-e-Islami hides other practices beneath its outward facade of virtue and the sweet smile of its leader.
The silently spoken part of a letter reveals this reality—under the guise of holy preaching, there is a kind of sexual slavery for women who join the Islamic Students’ Organization, the women’s wing of Jamaat, in the name of establishing an Islamic state.
1. Published information and internal letters
Human rights activists have been drawn to leaked internal communications documents about the organization’s culture and treatment of women. At least one communication reveals a pattern of organizational behavior that legitimizes gender-based sexual abuse under the guise of discipline.
A confidential letter signed by Jamaat Ameer Dr. Shafiqur Rahman on October 5, 2020, was circulated among the party’s women’s and men’s wings, 1. Published information and internal letters
It is reported that in this, the Amir acknowledged the incidents of rape and other forms of national oppression committed by religious brothers across the country and proposed internal solutions.
This directive suggests that instead of condemning or legally addressing sexual violence against women in the Jamaat-e-Islami party, sexuality is institutionalized. Such directives are a cause for serious concern from both a moral and legal perspective.
2. Language and impact analysis of instructions
A close reading of the aforementioned letter reveals that Jamaat-e-Islami implicitly acknowledges incidents of rape and abuse among its members and prioritizes organizational control. Rather than viewing members’ sexual behavior as an isolated offense, the party’s top priority is to manage it internally. The letter does not mention legal accountability for such crimes.
The phrase “rape and repeated rape” in the letter is a particularly emotive one. The sentence does not directly condemn these acts. Such wording portrays these crimes as normal—which suggests that the events would pose a “risk” to the party if they were to become public rather than a moral or legal crisis. In other words, these incidents are presented here as a “public relations risk.”
3. Organizational human resource behavior and restraint management
The letter also revealed that the “behavior and restraint of organizational manpower” needed to be controlled.
The letter also reveals that the party’s top leadership—especially the Majlis-e-Shurai—is responsible for overseeing sexual discipline among its members.
The expression of such a view from the party’s top board on the management of sexual conduct clearly indicates that it is not concerned with the protection of victims of sexual violence committed by male members of the party or other parties or groups involved with them in the Islamic State movement, or with the prosecution of such perpetrators. Rather, the emphasis is on controlling the reputation of the party to ensure that internal news does not leak out and damage the party’s reputation. The narrative of the aforementioned letter clarifies the policy of minimizing disruptions such as sexual leaks to the larger ideological goal of establishing an Islamic state.
It is noteworthy that the decisions mentioned in the letter were taken on the recommendation of the Majlis-e-Shura, the highest policy-making body of Jamaat. The fact that
a religious-political board would interfere in the private sexual conduct of its members in this way raises serious ethical and legal questions. The letter does not express any clear concern for the safety of women and children, victims of sexual violence, or the public at large. Instead, the emphasis is on ensuring that this information does not fall into the hands of the media.
So it can be said that the aforementioned letter represents a form of political control rather than a policy of reform. The policy that states that sexual violence is not considered a moral failing or social crime by Jamaat, but rather a type of behavior that arises out of necessity, and the party manages these issues secretly through organizational processes.
As a result, the letter proposes a Jamaat-e-Islami framework for preserving the male workforce, without regulating sexual harassment of male members, preventing sexual abuse of female members and boys within the Islamic groups, madrasas and mosques of the Jamaat’s national network. The framework is outlined later.
4. Legal perspective
Let us evaluate the instructions in this letter from a legal perspective.
As of August 5, 2024, rape, assault, and sexual assault are recognized as serious crimes under the laws of Bangladesh. Any political party operating within the constitutional framework has a responsibility to uphold these legal and ethical standards and maintain its own honor and dignity.
In this context, this written directive from Jamaat-e-Islami indicates a deviation from national law and international human rights obligations, which is very worrying.
There is growing public concern that the interim government—under the guise of reform and in cahoots with Jamaat and its ally BNP—is likely to weaken existing legal protections for women and children. Even after tacitly supporting the return of Islamist groups to power since July 2024, such internal practices suggest extremist Islamic behavior.
As noted earlier, rather than strengthening legal accountability or investing in education to prevent abuse, the letter outlines an internal “discipline” system. What does this discipline look like?
This is a structure that reveals the pattern of individual control in Islam’s extreme patriarchal society, bypassing the courts. It can be said to create a kind of parallel social and judicial system that conceals men’s sexual crimes against women and children. The Jamaat’s directives reveal an institutional pattern of organizational complexity in the sexual abuse of women and children.
Let us assume that not all those involved in the national oppression of rape and sexual assault are formal members of Jamaat-e-Islami. But the party works with all the groups and institutions committed to the establishment of an Islamic state in Bangladesh out of a sense of ideological brotherhood. The Jamaat Shura has influence over them. They are all connected, directly or through friendship, to the political and theological worldview of Jamaat, as brothers of the larger Ummah.
Yet the steady increase and persistence of such abuses across the country over the past few decades proves that the internal “discipline process” described in the aforementioned letter has played no role in preventing harm to women, boys, girls, and children in the larger society. Rather, it has served as a cover for the party’s recognition of the superiority of male sexuality and its institutional inaction.
5. Organizational manpower conservation and internal remedies
The directive proposes a kind of internal remedy for damage control, to ensure that news of Jamaat members being implicated in the aforementioned crimes does not spread and harm the party.
There are two aspects to this proposal: (1) to keep the sexuality of Islamic members who engage in sexual abuse of young girls and boys and women within limits, and (2) to manage male sexuality through the obedience and support of female members.
Before revealing the details, it is important to understand the organization behind this advice.
The Majlis-e-Shura, the Jamaat’s internal council, is the highest decision-making body, whose representatives have an understanding with the Shura of Islamic countries on matters of Islamic faith. The recommendations of this shadow board give rise to worrying moral codes in any Islamic state.
Traditionally, the Shura acts as an advisory council in Islamic governance, managing regional interests and overseeing strategic, doctrinal and operational matters. The Jamaat’s Shura, made up of around 30 Rukn-level members, exercises significant control over all internal affairs of the country, society and party, including sexual discipline.
Other Islamist parties registered with the Bangladesh Election Commission—such as Hefazat-e-Islam, Zaker Party, Islami Oikya Jote, and Khilafat Majlis—operate separately but are ideologically linked to Jamaat. According to observers, they have organized the “Islamic State Movement” together. They have united around a common understanding of blasphemy and Islamic law. During Sheikh Hasina’s rule, they have widely publicized the term “Taghuti Rashtra” (a state of tyrants).
6. Organizational and political context of the directive
What does this internal directive from Jamaat mean in today’s political climate?
The structure and tone of the letter suggest that Jamaat is defining clear biological roles for its male and female members, in an effort to manage the growing image crisis over allegations of sexual assault against Islamists in the country.
The letter’s first directive states:
“Currently, there is widespread discussion and criticism about rape and assault across the country. Agent media, operated at the behest of a foreign country, is waiting to trap Jamaat and its affiliated organizations.”
Rather than admitting the wrongdoings of its members, the party portrays public and media concerns as a foreign-backed conspiracy. This directive can be widely interpreted as an indirect reference to India. It reflects Jamaat’s long-standing resentment and hostility towards India and its ideological ties with Pakistan.
That is why Jamaat has presented the news of rape and molestation and the naming of Jamaat-related individuals and their criminal activities as political sabotage rather than as a moral failure on its part.
To be continued… (The letter from Jamaat-e-Islami will be attached in the second part)
Jahanara Noori
August 7 , 2025 Sweden

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