Sheikh Hasina Avoided U.S. Defense Pact to Protect National Interests, but Muhammad Yunus Accepted Everything in the Name of a Trade Deal

February 23, 2026 • National
Sheikh Hasina Avoided U.S. Defense Pact to Protect National Interests, but Muhammad Yunus Accepted Everything in the Name of a Trade Deal
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Special Correspondent

The GSOMIA and ACSA agreements proposed with the United States during the previous Awami League government were not signed despite being pending for a long time. The government’s argument was to protect Bangladesh’s national interests, sovereignty, and geopolitical balance. However, the interim government led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus signed a controversial reciprocal trade agreement within just 18 months (August 2024 to February 2026) under US pressure, which includes defense and security-related provisions—which many believe could have an impact equal to or greater than GSOMIA-ACSA.

Despite the strong pressure from the US administration to protect the Awami League government’s domestic interests, the GSOMIA and AQSA agreements have been avoided, yet in just 18 months, the Yunus government has handed over Bangladesh’s interests to the Americans by agreeing to all the terms of the GSOMIA and AQSA agreements in the name of the “US trade agreement”.

Although the Awami League government led by Sheikh Hasina has been discussing drafts of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSMIA) and the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the United States since 2019, they did not sign them until 2024.

The draft was passed at the eighth Dhaka-Washington Partnership Dialogue in March 2022, and US Undersecretary Victoria Nuland expressed hope that it would enhance security cooperation. But the government has not signed the agreement.

In 2022-2023, several high-profile US delegations on Indo-Pacific issues, including US Ambassador Peter Haas, visited Dhaka to highlight the importance of the agreements, saying they were “technical” and that the US had such agreements with 70+ countries—not military bases or alliances. Yet, Foreign Minister Dr. AK Abdul Momen made it clear in 2023 that there was “no time or opportunity” to sign such agreements before the elections.

The Awami League government feared that these agreements would involve Bangladesh in the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, disrupt the balance with India and China, and pose a threat to sovereignty through the sharing of military information. As a result, the then government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh avoided the agreements, maintaining the policy of “friendship with all, hostility with none”.

But Dr. Muhammad Yunus’ interim government began a rapid and comprehensive series of agreements with the United States after coming to power in August 2024. After signing various MoUs in 2025 (such as wheat imports with US Wheat Exporters, LNG purchases with Excelerate Energy), the United States-Bangladesh Agreement on Reciprocal Trade was signed on February 9, 2026—just 3 days before the national elections.

In this agreement, the US side reduced the reciprocal tariff on Bangladeshi goods from 20% to 19% and provided zero tariff benefits on some textile products (using US materials). But in return, Bangladesh had to give extensive conditions:

Defense and Security – Related Clauses :

The defense and security clauses (under the United States-Bangladesh Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, 2026) are primarily detailed in Section 4: Economic and National Security and other related sections of the agreement (such as Article 4.3). These clauses are being seen as defense and national security obligations under the guise of a “trade agreement,” which is very similar to the terms of military cooperation such as GSOMIA and ACSA.

Increasing purchases of US military equipment and limiting purchases from other countries :

The agreement directly states that “Bangladesh shall endeavor to increase purchases of US military equipment and limit military equipment purchases from certain countries.” Here, “certain countries” mainly refers to China (and possibly Russia).

This will make Bangladesh dependent on US arms and limit the opportunity to buy cheaper and alternative weapons from China/Russia. In addition, “The United States shall work with Bangladesh to streamline and enhance defense trade.”—which promises to facilitate and expand defense trade. This paves the way for military information sharing like GSOMIA and logistical support like ACSA, as advanced US arms sales are limited without these agreements.

Commitment to expand defense trade :

Article 4.3 of the agreement explicitly mentions “streamline and enhance defense trade,” which aims to make Bangladesh a major market for the US defense industry. It includes binding commitments such as the purchase of Boeing aircraft (such as Boeing aircraft for Biman), which leads to defense-related logistics and technology cooperation. Analysts say it has an impact “equivalent” to or deeper than the GSOMIA-AXA, as it includes a commitment to increase direct arms purchases and limits other suppliers.

Additional obligations related to national security and economic security :

Cooperation on Export Controls and Sanctions: Bangladesh needs to align with the US export control regime to control trade in sensitive technologies from China/Russia and avoid violating any US interests.

Complementary measures: If the United States takes any trade action for security reasons, Bangladesh will have to support it and take complementary restrictions.

Nuclear Procurement Restrictions: Bangladesh will not be able to use or purchase nuclear reactors/fuel from any country that “threatens the essential interests of the United States.”

Supply Chain Transparency: Limiting the involvement of “countries of national security concern” (China, etc.) in the supply chain of sensitive technology and increasing transparency.

Critics have called these clauses “GSOMIA-AXA equivalent” because they have the effect of increasing military information/technology sharing, logistical support, and weapons reliance—all of which the Awami League government had avoided to protect sovereignty. The agreement, signed on February 9, 2026, raises concerns about increased US influence over Bangladesh’s defense policy.

Analysts say the deal paves the way for a shift toward defense and intelligence cooperation, similar to the Gisomia-Aqsa deal—because it directly increases reliance on US arms and limits other suppliers. The interim government’s quick signing has been criticized by many as “rushed and OPEC,” akin to capitulating to external pressure rather than national interests.

The interim government claims that the agreement is to protect export markets and provide economic benefits. But in his farewell speech, Dr. Yunus claimed that his government has transformed Bangladesh from a “submissive” country to a sovereign and dignified one.

However, critics are raising questions: Why did the interim government do what the Awami League failed to do despite US pressure? To what extent did this protect Bangladesh’s interests?

The new government (BNP led by Tarique Rahman) is now looking at reviewing and possibly amending/cancelling the agreement, while US President Trump is also pushing for the finalization of the Gisomia-Aqsa. This has sparked a new debate in Bangladesh’s foreign policy.

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