Khaleda Zia and the reckoning of an era: grief, struggle and an ambiguous legacy in Bangladesh politics

January 7, 2026 • Opinion
Khaleda Zia and the reckoning of an era: grief, struggle and an ambiguous legacy in Bangladesh politics
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Opinion

A long, intensely polarized chapter in Bangladeshi politics has come to an end. The death of former Prime Minister and BNP Chairperson Khaleda Zia is not just the end of a political career; it is the apparent end of a particular political project of post-independence state-building. As much as mourning is inevitable at this moment, it is also important to assess her legacy honestly, with a sense of responsibility to history.

Khaleda Zia’s rise was an exceptional and historic event in Bangladeshi politics. Her rise in a rigid patriarchal society will certainly be studied in political sociology and history one day. A woman once confined to a home-centered life gradually rose to the leadership of a major political party—a rarity in a rigid patriarchal power structure; on top of that, religious prejudices against women were also prevalent in the society. In the vacuum of political uncertainty that had arisen after the assassination of her husband, President Ziaur Rahman, she organized the BNP, reorganized the party structure, and transformed the party into an effective force in electoral politics. She became a symbol of unity for the BNP and its supporters. Her role in the movement against dictator Hussain Muhammad Ershad is historically recognized; the movement simultaneously with Sheikh Hasina at that time was an important chapter in Bangladesh’s democratic struggle.

It is only fair to acknowledge these achievements in the obituary. But the path that Khaleda Zia’s political project chose after coming to power gradually became costly for both the party and the state.

Political scientists call this Coalition Contamination—when a mainstream party forms an alliance with a force that has a very heavy historical and moral burden at the state level. After the 2001 elections, the formation of a government with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party-led Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami gave BNP power, but in the long run, it narrowed the party’s moral standing and international acceptance.

Considering the perspective of Khaleda Zia’s time, although the economic growth situation was somewhat stable, it did not benefit the people in general. Five and a half to six percent growth is not bad, but it is important to remember that during her time, there was no pressure from the international market on Bangladesh due to Covid or wars and internal conflicts. Still, the main reason for the growth not reaching the desired level was the result of the structural and moral weakness of her regime.

Let us give an example from the report of an international organization. During Khaleda Zia’s time, the moral structure of governance had collapsed to a great extent. The most reliable evidence of this structural breakdown is found in international statistics. From 2001 to 2005—for five consecutive years—Bangladesh was ranked as the most corrupt country in the world in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. This experience is not an accusation against any party; it is a document of the failure of a governance system. As one can see, Bangladesh’s highest score out of 100 in 2001-06 was 20, while despite thousands of criticisms, the lowest score was 20 during the period 2009-2024. According to the World Bank and other development organizations, during that period 2001-06, corruption reduced Bangladesh’s potential economic growth by about one and a half to two percent per year. If this one and a half to two percent had been added to the growth at that time, it would have exceeded eight percent. In other words, the state was not only morally damaged, but also faced long-term economic losses. This is not just administrative failure; it is a structural signal of the governance system.

It is important to understand the comparative reality from this point. The scale at which the state’s delivery capacity has reached, despite political debates and criticisms during 2009–2024, provides a solid baseline. According to the latest data from the World Bank, Bangladesh’s GDP per capita is expected to be around $2,600 in 2024. Two decades ago, this indicator was in the hundreds of dollars. At the same time, the overall GDP volume reached about $450 billion. This does not mean that everything was perfect; it means that the income-capability of the people, the size of the market, and the economic scale of the state have changed significantly.

The comparison is even clearer in the power sector. In 2009, grid-based generation capacity was below 5,000 MW; in the 2022-23 fiscal year, it was over 25,000 MW. There may be debates about the quality of the policy, the energy mix or the capacity charge, but the political reality is brutal—people saw corruption as the main cause of the dysfunction in the industrial, urban and service sectors. Khaleda Zia could have used her administrative and moral strength to take action to uproot all the branches of corruption at home and abroad. She did not do this for the sake of quotas.

The same is true of physical infrastructure. The Padma Bridge has signaled a qualitative change in the connectivity of the south-west. The launch of the Metrorail in Dhaka has set a new standard of urban transport efficiency. These are not symbolic achievements; they are evidence of the state’s scaled delivery. The commercial use of the Jamuna Bridge began during Khaleda Zia’s time, but there too, it could not be reaped due to corruption-related mismanagement.

Behind all this talk about corruption was a kind of dual system established during Khaleda Zia’s rule. The system of government that Bangladesh entered after the 2001 elections is difficult to explain simply as an elected, people-friendly government. In reality, the state was being run under a kind of dual power structure. The constitutional executive power was in the hands of the government, but many decisions related to policymaking, appointments, tenders, licenses, and law and order were determined from an undeclared center called Hawa Bhaban; her son was in control of this building. In the language of political science, this was the informalization of the state—where personal proximity became the currency of governance instead of law and process. Max Weber’s “Rule of Law” was replaced by “Rule by clique.” This was not just an era of corruption; it was a time of running the state in violation of state rules. Khaleda Zia’s fault was that she did not take any initiative to stop these time-consuming activities of Hawa Bhaban; Rather, it is said that he ran the administration under the orders of Hawa Bhaban.

Now let us come to the issue of BNP’s alliance with Jamaat politics. Another important consequence of this alliance politics was the competition to take a tougher stance (Outbidding Dynamics), where within the alliance politics, the parties choose increasingly tougher language and positions to prove their acceptability. The long-term result of this is the erosion of the moral foundation of the state and the historical memory. There is pressure to outdo each other to survive politically within and outside the alliance, where the language and positions become increasingly tougher; this essentially becomes the pressure to take a “tougher” stance in religious and nationalist discourse. As a result, oblique or skeptical comments about the memory of the Liberation War, Bangabandhu, and the founding of the state become political weapons. In the language of sociology, this is a dangerous form of ‘memory-politics’, where history is no longer the basis of unity but a tool for competition for power.

Let us give an example. In 2015 (Bangla Tribune, December 21, 2015), Khaleda Zia made a public statement that “there is a debate” about the number of martyrs in the Liberation War—a statement quoted in various media outlets at the time—which, in the language of sociology, is a kind of memory politics that creates uncertainty about the memory of the founding of the state so that political parties can reconstruct their “legitimacy.” But its social cost is terrible—because the Liberation War is Bangladesh’s biggest “moral common ground”; framing it as a “controversy” traps society in a kind of permanent polarization. Khaleda Zia’s controversial statements about the number of martyrs in the Liberation War or her tendency to devalue the history of independence as “how many books” are not just personal opinions; they were part of memory politics. Democracy does not grow stronger when the strongest moral foundation of the state—the collective memory of 1971—is questioned; Instead, society becomes trapped in a chronic and dangerous polarization.

A more serious chapter is the institutional shadow of violent politics. The rise of militancy in the country during 2001-2006 was a measurable reality. In 2005, a series of bomb attacks in 63 districts in a single day exposed the breakdown of the state’s security structure. The grenade attack on August 21, 2004—in which an attempt was made to assassinate opposition leader Sheikh Hasina—is one of the darkest chapters in Bangladesh’s political history. The state drama that was orchestrated to bring ‘Judge Mia’ to the fore to confuse the investigation after that incident is a complete antithesis of the transparency of the judicial process. Khaleda Zia herself said in parliament that Sheikh Hasina had carried a bomb in her vanity bag. This comment raised questions about Khaleda Zia’s stature as a human being then and still does.

This is where the principal–agent trap comes into play. When the political leadership (principal) becomes overly dependent on field-level cadres, security structures, or extremist networks, those agents gradually become autonomous. As a result, violence and repression spiral out of control of the leadership, and the legal legitimacy of the state is severely damaged. In this process, the opposition party is pressured, but democracy suffers even more. We have seen the consequences of this later in state and party history. Unfortunately, Khaleda Zia was not least responsible for this institutional decay.

The damage of this politics is not limited to the past—the evidence is clear even today. Today, the relationship between BNP and Jamaat has practically collapsed. Public statements, field-level clashes, and political positional distance show—once strategic allies are now rivals. Today, the breakdown of BNP-Jamaat relations is actually a delayed backlash of that alliance politics—where the strategic advantage that was once there has become a political burden over time; the power that was once used as a junior partner in power has now become a competitor in the political market.

This reality proves that the alliance with Jamaat has not only damaged the secular foundation of the state; it has also weakened the BNP in the long run. On the one hand, the party has lost international support, and on the other hand, it has given political space to forces within the country that are now narrowing its own organizational and ideological space. Khaleda Zia’s responsibility in this regard is no small one.

Yet, to draw a one-line conclusion in remembering Khaleda Zia would be an injustice to history. She was at once a militant, determined and popular leader; and at the same time a ruler during whose tenure the moral foundations of the state, the security structure and the historical memory were seriously questioned. Her political life captures the contradiction of Bangladeshi politics—where the language of democracy is spoken, but its limits are repeatedly crossed in the exercise of power.

Today, as we mourn her death, the most honest stance would be to acknowledge this dual truth together. Mourning does not mean forgetting history; mourning means responsible remembrance. Khaleda Zia’s legacy is a complex collection of glory and shame, achievements and failures. This unwavering recognition is perhaps the nation’s most just tribute to a political leader—one where there is mourning, but no evasion of historical responsibility.

Dr. Shyamal Das
Professor,
Homeland Security, Elizabeth City State University,
North Carolina, USA.
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